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by time,” to quote a character from the film Miller’s 
Crossing.5 It might be possible that the answers to our 
problems today lay beyond our own narrow history.
Roth does levy some thoughtful criticisms that 
every administrator at an institution of higher educa-
tion ought to consider. For example, he is fairly dis-
missive of emphases on both technical and vocational 
programs, as well as the specialized research institu-
tion. While I do think there is a place for vocational 
development and specialized research, it is interesting 
that many small liberal arts colleges today, attempting 
to answer current problems, are moving away from 
their traditional arts and sciences roots to become ei-
ther technical and vocational institutions (158, 190) 
or specialized research institutions where faculty no 
longer educate students liberally, but instead focus on 
their own research agenda (104).
A second poignant criticism regards student evalu-
ations and the power they have to change the educa-
tional experience for the worse (136-137). Roth writes, 
“[T]he great bulk of the information [that university 
officials] use to determine the quality of teaching is the 
satisfaction of the students as expressed on surveys. In 
his introduction to the 2002 edition of The Academic 
Revolution, Jencks puts it this way: ‘So instead of giv-
ing students what grownups think the students need, 
most teaching institutions are under considerable pres-
sure to give students what they want’” (137).
Despite my criticisms of Beyond the University, 
Roth has written an important and engaging book 
that speaks to some of the most important problems 
in higher education today. As a college president, 
criticizing certain trends that are particularly popular 
among college administrators, he shows that he swims 
upstream, for which he ought to be applauded. This 
book ought to be required reading for any administra-
tor considering a move to technical and vocational ed-
ucation, or a push towards emphasizing research and 
grant-winning. It is also recommended for anyone in-
terested in knowing at least one strand of the develop-
ment of higher education in American history. I hope 
this fine book prompts discussion across American 
colleges about the ultimate purpose of higher educa-
tion.
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For me, To the Edge is a headache to read. That 
is not because it is overly long. Its seven chapters 
are wrought in 218 pages. Nevertheless, the subject 
matter of corporate finance and regulation is highly 
complex. A plethora of laws, regulations, agency titles 
(with acronyms), corporate titles, and terminology 
from corporate and government finance litters the 
text. The book is about the Great Recession in the 
American economy that commenced in 2008 and the 
ways that government policy makers and regulators 
sought to deal with the causes and consequences of 
a plunging economy. The scholar addressing this in-
quiry, Philip Wallach, is a Princeton Ph.D. in politics, 
interested in the regulatory statutes of the American 
administrative state. To reckon with his subject matter, 
the reader must penetrate the inner workings, indeed 
shifting sands, of the nation’s governmental and cor-
porate bureaucracies.
Even the headline issues were difficult to under-
stand from the onset of the economic crisis. After ear-
lier economic tremors, in March 2008 the country’s 
seventh-largest investment bank, Bear Stearns, ap-
proached financial insolvency. In an elaborate arrange-
ment primarily engineered by Henry Paulson, then 
Secretary of the Treasury, and Ben Bernanke, chair-
man of the Federal Reserve, the government provided 
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federal loan incentives to press J.P. Morgan Chase 
Bank to acquire Bear Stearns and provide liquidity 
to Bear Stearns’ customers. Half a year later, Lehman 
Brothers, the nation’s fourth-largest investment bank, 
suffered liquidity problems. This time the government 
response was different. Judging that the consequences 
and liabilities of a Bear Stearns-like solution were dis-
tinguishable from the Lehman case, Secretary Paulson 
let it be known that no government aid was forthcom-
ing. The result was that Lehman’s Board of Directors 
unanimously voted for bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008.
Also teetering on insolvency as the 2008 financial 
crisis deepened were the federal government’s spon-
sored enterprises known as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, quasi-governmental lenders for home mortgages. 
Legally private corporations but created as federal insti-
tutions central to the mortgage market serving Ameri-
can homeowners, they were too big to be allowed, 
by the federal government, to fail. Thus to save these 
government-sponsored enterprises, Congress passed 
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(HERA) at Paulson’s and the Bush administration’s 
urging. Responding to stock-price declines in Freddy 
and Fanny shares due to investor fears about insolven-
cy, Paulson used the new law to put Fanny and Freddie 
under government conservatorship. Among the details 
of the solution, the Treasury committed $100 billion 
to each of them, later raising the allocations to $200 
billion, thereby backing the net worth of the firms and 
stanching downward market pressure on the prices for 
Fanny and Freddie stocks.
The world’s fifth-largest insurance company, 
American International Group (AIG), was also stuck 
in the home mortgage business. One of its divisions, 
by writing “credit default swaps” that insured the value 
of mortgage-backed securities, went underwater when 
the housing market downturn revealed that the mort-
gages underlying these securities were seriously over-
valued. AIG was obligated to huge losses. As property 
and security values plummeted, AIG exhausted its 
liquid funds and bankruptcy was imminent. Where 
could it access a capital infusion? After private sector 
attempts to generate a financing package fell apart, the 
Federal Reserve came up with a secured loan through 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for $85 billion, 
but on very demanding terms (government ownership 
and 12.5% interest). AIG’s board approved the deal.
To illustrate how the fever of declining asset values 
can spread, he considers the money market mutual 
funds (MMFs). For depositors, accounts in MMFs 
were considered a safe preserver of financial value. But 
when Lehman went down, F, Reserve Primary Fund 
(a major MFF), suffered a huge loss. When it was re-
quired by law to make the loss public, a run on its 
funds began, and the run created panic in the MMF 
market. The MMF loan business sustains short-term 
financing for large corporate firms, for example, pro-
viding timely cash for their payrolls. In short, the panic 
threatened to seize up a sector of the credit market that 
would endanger a wide range of corporate enterprises. 
The Federal Reserve created a short-term solution by 
dispersing funds to banks in order to purchase MMF 
assets so that they could satisfy investor redemptions. 
The program put $150 billion into this specialized 
market in its first ten days, successfully stanching the 
need for investor redemptions and thereby reducing 
redemption demands to normalcy.
Despite measures already described, the mort-
gage market continued to deteriorate. Paulson and 
Bernanke expressed their need for more resources of 
money and discretion to President Bush, who agreed 
to a congressional proposal. The central element, re-
membered as TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program), 
was to allow Treasury to buy devalued mortgage assets 
from banks and investment firms. The initial proposal 
was rejected with bipartisan opposition. The reaction 
prompted the worst ever one-day drop on the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average—778 points. Terror in the 
financial sector stimulated changed views in Congress. 
In the first week of October 2008, the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act became law, funding 
TARP with $700 billion and giving tools of discre-
tion to Bernanke and Paulson. In a rapid fashion, the 
Treasury directly injected capital into banks by taking 
ownership of preferred shares of stock.   It directed 
$125 billion to nine major banks and a like amount to 
smaller needy but healthy banks.
In a less anticipated move, TARP funds became 
the emergency source of funds to General Motors and 
Chrysler. An ambivalent President Bush responded to 
the ailing auto builders headed toward what he called 
a “disorderly bankruptcy” in the time between the 
election and President-elect Obama’s inaugural. Bush 
said, “I believe that good policy is not to dump [on 
Obama] a major catastrophe in his first day of office.” 
From TARP, short-term loans were made to facilitate 
restructuring at GM and Chrysler in an attempt to 
prevent both layoffs and bankruptcy. The Obama ad-
ministration put in place an Auto Task Force, which 
oversaw subsequent orderly bankruptcies, resulting in 
Chrysler eventually being reorganized, then partner-
ing with Fiat. In 2014, Fiat completed its acquisition 
of Chrysler. A reshaped GM also made a successful 
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recovery. The auto bail-outs made taxpayers unsecured 
creditors to these public corporations. It should be 
added that the Treasury began selling its stake in Gen-
eral Motors in 2013 and completed the sale of its last 
holding in December, reportedly losing $9 billion on 
an investment of $49.5 billion (183).
The government’s reported loss regarding General 
Motors triggers the question, what did the crisis re-
sponses by the federal government cost the American 
taxpayer? Perhaps the most authoritative judgment 
about the cost of TAROO cost is that of the Office of 
Management and Budget in 2014: an estimated $39 
billion. Following a labored discussion of the question, 
Wallach argues that “any grand total calculated for the 
government’s crisis responses will say as much about 
the author’s assumptions as about the underlying 
facts…. [W]e can nevertheless say with certainty that 
the responses cost less than most observers initially ex-
pected, so that citing the dollar costs of the bailouts 
became a less compelling critique of the administra-
tion as time went by” (185).
What cannot be gainsaid is that the measures 
crafted by Paulson and Bernanke during the Bush ad-
ministration, and continued under Geithner and Ber-
nanke during the Obama administration, did prevent 
a financial collapse that might have become truly cata-
strophic. As a political commentator myself, I think 
that it is remarkable to note how peripheral to the 
presidential election in the fall of 2008 the crisis was. 
Its issues were largely ignored during the campaign. 
After the transition from Republican Bush to Demo-
crat Obama, there was no sharp reshaping of the crisis 
responses. To the contrary, Obama continued what 
Bush set in motion, retaining Bernanke at the Federal 
Reserve and moving Geithner from the Federal Re-
serve in New York to Treasury Secretary.
It is true that the crisis responses did necessarily 
pick economic winners and losers. J.P. Morgan Chase 
was a winner because Paulson engineered a bargain 
price for its acquisition of Bear Stearns. Yet all of 
Lehman’s interested parties lost in its unaided collapse. 
AIG executives and investors suffered a great deal, 
but the company survives. So do General Motors and 
Chrysler, though hugely changed. But Ford, taking no 
federal funds, could have been a huge winner had GM 
and Chrysler bankruptcies been harsher. What about 
homeowners with mortgages who suffered value losses 
because overvalued mortgage-backed securities put the 
housing market into a downward spiral? Ordinary sav-
ers, trying to live on interest earnings, took a haircut as 
interest rates plummeted to near zero, where the rates 
have persisted to the present day.
The complexity of Wallach’s explanatory task is ex-
acerbated by the need to identify agencies, programs, 
and financial terminology relevant to the story. To Wal-
lach’s credit, he did his best to account for and identify 
the agencies and programs relevant to the story told 
in this book. There is, for example, a four-page, fifty-
two item, alphabetically ordered “glossary of crisis laws 
and programs,” listed by their acronyms (from “ABCP. 
Asset-backed commercial paper; short term bonds 
backed by physical assets” to “WaMu. Washington 
Mutual Bank.”) Wallach’s footnote citations fill over 
80 pages of the book—pages 223 to 306—with 952 
footnotes, most of them citing more than one source. 
To the Edge actually celebrates the success of nim-
ble policy administration because in reality, the Ameri-
can economy was close to total disaster, one that was 
arrested by incentives to corporate America from the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Prudently, Wallach 
does not expend much effort parsing out blame for 
the origins of the crisis of 2008. His critical observa-
tions about how the federal government responded 
are simplified by applying the term “adhocracy.” He 
faults policymakers for improvising crisis responses, 
some quite arbitrary, with tenuous statutory support. 
Of course, that opinion was not rare in the financial 
community. To this day there are cases pending. For 
example, former AIG Chairman Maurice Greenberg 
is still in federal court contesting the fairness of the 
government take-over of his company without “just 
compensation” (see June 15, 2015 issue of the The 
New York Times). Indeed, Wallach gets the title for 
his book from former Federal Reserve chairman, Paul 
Volcker, who saw the Fed’s actions as extending “to 
the very edge of its lawful and implied powers” (54). 
Wallach has an easier time delineating the stretching 
of legal boundaries than he does with differentiating 
legitimacy/illegitimacy standards apart from the law.
Before departing his rendition of the crisis and its 
aftermath, Wallach offers some prescriptions for how 
government should arrange policy for the “next time” 
such an economic challenge emerges. His expressed 
hope for a “more active legislature” sounds rather like 
dutiful constitutionalism instead of realistic advice. 
Congress does not do well at anticipating long-term 
future challenges, but, as in this case, it does l e n d 
legal authority in times of crisis. Wallach’s strongest 
pitch is for “an accountable slush fund” (213 ff), of 
$50 or $100 billion for the Secretary of the Treasury 
to spend with discretion in times of exigency. Imagine 
the Tea Party response to that proposition. What con-
gressional members, seeking reelection, would defend 
a vote in favor of such a proposal?
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Wallach has given us a seriously directed, thor-
oughly documented rendition of a complicated, 
government-managed calming of the U.S. Great Re-
cession. On the whole Paulson, Bernanke, Geithner, 
and their governmental minions, though guilty of 
choosing winners and losers with some arbitrariness, 
contained the disaster to the benefit of and greater 
good for most Americans. We who seek public justice 
on moral standards can question specifics, but on the 
whole, public peace was preserved by the steady hands 
of those in governmental authority. Relatively mild 
protests from the right (Tea Party) and left (Occupy 
Wall Street) necessitated no tanks in the streets. Curi-
ously, the elected politicians did not divide by party 
but coalesced in support of prudent policy measures 
from first a Republican administration and then a 
Democratic one. 
This book is not an easy read, but Wallach has de-
vised his own eleven-page summary of its essentials in 
a recent essay, “Democratically Accountable Adhoc-
racy? The Challenges of Legitimating the Responses 
to the 2008 Financial Crisis,” available online at The 
Brookings Institute’s website.1 Readers of this review 
may find Wallach’s essay as much as they care to know 
about Wallach’s recommendations.
Endnote
1. www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/17–
legitimating–financial–crisis–adhocracy–wallach
